Skip to content

Your Weekly Digest | Issue 240

Valur Thrainsson
5 min read

Welcome to CompetitionFeed, a weekly newsletter with the most recent and relevant competition and anti-trust news, blogs and journal publications. Never miss an update. If you’d like to receive issues over email, you can sign-up here.

Good morning CompetitionFeed readers!

Enjoying this newsletter? Share it with friends, coworkers and colleagues.

Here below, you find the most recent and relevant competition and anti-trust news, blogs and journal publications over the last week.

Enjoy :)

Illumina in EU antitrust sights over premature $8 bln Grail deal | Reuters

U.S. life sciences company Illumina could face a hefty fine for completing its $8 billion cash-and-stock takeover of cancer detection test maker Grail without first securing EU antitrust approval.

Read More
FTC sues Facebook for antitrust violations again - POLITICO

The move comes after a federal judge tossed the agency’s original suit in June.

Read More
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has found that NVIDIA’s purchase of Arm raises serious competition concerns. Read more.
Former FTC commissioner on the new Facebook antitrust lawsuit - YouTube
William Kovacic, former FTC commissioner, joins 'Squawk on the Street' to discuss the agency's refiled lawsuit against Facebook, and the calls to break up Big tech...
Watch
When we earlier reported the German Facebook proceedings in terms of a legal opera [Link], this metaphor was, as I am afraid we have to admit, a little ill-fitting. As things now seem, we can observe a whole oeuvre, a whole cinematic universe, as a good number of spin-offs, sequels and side-stories centred around Facebook... Read more.
U.S. Senators Blumenthal, Blackburn and Klobuchar introduced last week the Open App Markets Act bill, a bill aiming to “promote competition and reduce gatekeeper power in the app economy, increase … Read more.
OPINION — Several proposals in Congress aimed at Big Tech would ultimately harm startups by severely curtailing their ability to be acquired. Read more.
The U.S. economy survived the COVID-19 pandemic and associated government-imposed business shutdowns with a variety of innovations that facilitated online shopping, contactless payments, and reduced use and handling of cash, a known vector of disease transmission. While many of these innovations were new, they would have been impossible but for their reliance on an established... Read more.
Recently, the Turkish Competition Authority (“TCA”) has published its reasoned decision in which it conditionally cleared the merger transaction[1], planned through the incorporation of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (“FCA”) and Peugeot S.A. (“PSA”) into FCA. In this regard, especially two points have aroused curiosity: (i) what would be the competitive concerns that may arise after... Read more.
Vertical mergers have attracted much attention in recent years. We assess the role of presumptions and likelihoods in vertical merger analysis and guidelines. We focus in particular on the role that we believe statistical evidence in general—and retrospective analyses more specifically—should play in determining presumptions. We also discuss how horizontal merger guidelines provide frameworks to analyze the horizontal issues that can be associated with vertical mergers. We conclude that while some vertical mergers may raise concerns, the evidence at this point does not provide sufficient guidance to develop presumptions that are related to strictly vertical issues. Read more.
Claire Chambolle and Hugo Molina
We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers which supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The mechanism underlying this exclusion is that the compensation required by the retailer to renounce selling the rival product erodes with its buyer power. Among others, we further show that our theory holds when the buyer power differs across manufacturers or when the retailer can strategically narrow (or expand) its product assortment. Read more.
Claire Chambolle and Hugo Molina
We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers which supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The mechanism underlying this exclusion is that the compensation required by the retailer to renounce selling the rival product erodes with its buyer power. Among others, we further show that our theory holds when the buyer power differs across manufacturers or when the retailer can strategically narrow (or expand) its product assortment. Read more.
Like the newsletter?
Forward it to your friends or share it on social media :)
Did your friend forward it to you?
Sign up
Suggestions or comments?
Reply to this e-mail or write to valur@competitionfeed.com
Kind regards, Valur Þráinsson, Founder of CompetitionFeed.com. Email: valur@competitionfeed.com
*|LIST:ADDRESS|*
Unsubscribe | View in browser