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Your Weekly Digest | Issue 23/2022

Valur Thrainsson
5 min read

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Your Weekly Digest | Issue 23/2022
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Good morning!

Last week we sifted through 5.000+ articles from 100+ publishers to help you stay updated!

Below are the pieces that I have handpicked and find the most recent and relevant competition and anti-trust news, blogs, and journal publications.


Kind regards, Valur
Many advocates believe the bill must pass ahead of the midterms, or at least before House control potentially changes, in order to achieve the tech reforms. Read more.
Lina Khan’s year-long tenure heading up the Federal Trade Commission — she was sworn in on June 15, 2021 — has been unorthodox, to say the least. Khan is arguably the highest-profile chair in the agency’s history, and her appointment was surprising in more ways than one. Read more.
The State Anti-Monopoly Bureau says it has achieved “important results” in disciplining monopolistic behaviours and will now focus on restoring market confidence. Read more.
Legislation would block Amazon, Google, Facebook and Apple from favoring own products; backers of the bill have spent less than $200,000. Read more.
Shutting down the three-year probe lets Amazon dodge a fine and hands Vestager a victory by extracting changes without much effort. Read more.
Introduction The preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice in Servizio Elettrico Nazionale aimed to clarify, among others, two crucial issues concerning the prohibition of abuse of a dominant… Read more
Welcome to the FTC UMC Roundup for June 10, 2023. This is a week of headlines! One would be forgiven for assuming that our focus, once again, would on the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA). I heard on the radio yesterday that it’s champion, Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), has the 60 votes... Read more.
Panelists at the Stigler Center’s recent antitrust conference look at the antitrust case against Facebook and discuss potential theories of harm, as well as the remedies that enforcers around the world have proposed or implemented.  This year’s Stigler Center’s 2022 Antitrust and Competition Conference, which took place in late April this year, looked back over... Read more.
Christopher Decker, Amit Zac, Carola Casti, Amédée von Moltke, Ariel Ezrachi
Using a comprehensive database of all the decisions made under European and U.K. competition laws over the 15-year period to 2020, alongside households’ consumption and market data, we estimate the level and distribution of the savings from enforcement across the United Kingdom. Read more.
Viola Chen, Christopher Garmon, Kenneth Rios, David Schmidt
One approach that antitrust enforcement authorities use to address potentially anticompetitive mergers is to seek divestitures in specific, competitively problematic overlap markets while allowing the rest of the merger to consummate. We evaluate the efficacy of this approach by studying divestitures in 230 generic drug markets ordered by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission to remedy 25 mergers of generic prescription drug manufacturers from 2005 to 2016. Read more.
By allowing the supplier to contract simultaneously or sequentially with asymmetric retailers under Bertrand competition, we analyze the welfare implications of banning price discrimination in input markets. In contrast to Cournot competition, we find that: (i) under sequential contracting, the monopolistic supplier prefers to contract with an inefficient retailer first and an efficient retailer later; and (ii) when comparing consumers' surplus and social welfare under simultaneous and sequential contracting with uniform pricing (resp. price discrimination), consumers' surplus and welfare are smaller (resp. greater) in sequential contracting than in simultaneous contracting. However, the supplier always prefers simultaneous contracting over sequential contracting under Bertrand competition; and thus sequential contracting does not occur. And, in simultaneous contracting, consumer surplus and total welfare are higher for uniform pricing than price discrimination. Read more.
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