Here below you find the most read articles on CompetitionFeed over the last week.
Cost of anti-sickness medication soared eightfold in four years as pharmaceutical firms shared the profits while agreeing not to compete against each other, CMA alleges. Read More.
The U.S. Justice Department’s antitrust division staff has recommended the agency block T-Mobile US Inc’s $26 billion acquisition of smaller rival Sprint Corp, according to two sources familiar with the matter. Read More.
The U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust chief, Makan Delrahim, is still open to T-Mobile US Inc’s $26 billion acquisition of smaller rival Sprint Corp, CNBC reported on Thursday. Read More.
Qualcomm Inc illegally suppressed competition in the market for smartphone chips by threatening to cut off supplies and extracting excessive licensing fees, a U.S. judge ruled, a decision that could force the company to overhaul its business practices. Read More.
French and Italian-US auto giants Renault and Fiat Chrysler are set to announce talks on an alliance, with a view to a potential merger, informed sources said on Sunday. Read More.
The European Commission can confirm that on 20 May 2019 its officials carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of companies active in the grocery retail sector in France. Read More.
Letter to Santander UK plc about its non-compliance with Part 6 of the Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017, relating to Alerts. Read More.
GDPR is officially one year old. How have the first 12 months gone? Read More.
Implications and Questions Arising From The Supreme Court’s Antitrust Ruling in Apple, Inc. v. Pepper
On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court (“the Court”) announced its 5-4 decision in Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, permitting iPhone users to proceed with an antitrust suit against Apple alleging that it monopolized the retail market for iPhone apps. Read More.
Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro and Helder Vasconcelos
In this paper we investigate the anti-competitive effects of partial horizontal ownership in a setting where: (i) two cost-asymmetric firms compete à la Cournot; (ii) managers deal with eventual conflicting interests of the different shareholders by maximizing a weighted sum of firms operating profits; and (iii) weights result from the corporate control structure of the firm they run. Read More.
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