Here below you find the most read articles on CompetitionFeed over the last week.
The much-watched antitrust trial between the Justice Department and AT&T began on Thursday, with opening statements that presented starkly different visions for how the company’s blockbuster merger with Time Warner would fit into a media industry upturned by the internet.Read More.
Brussels on Wednesday approved Bayer’s $66 billion takeover of Monsanto, potentially clearing the way for the creation of the world’s largest player across the whole agricultural market, covering sectors from seeds to pesticides.Read More.
The European Commission has fined Elna, Hitachi Chemical, Holy Stone, Matsuo, NEC Tokin, Nichicon, Nippon Chemi-Con, Rubycon € 253 935 000. Together with the immunity applicant, Sanyo, they operated a cartel for the supply of aluminium and tantalum electrolytic capacitors between 1998 and 2012.Read More.
International Competition Network Adopts Guiding Principles for Procedural Fairness and New Recommendations for Merger Review
The International Competition Network (ICN) held its 17th annual conference, hosted by the Competition Commission of India, on March 21-23, 2018. Nearly 500 delegates from more than 70 jurisdictions participated, including competition experts from international organizations and the legal, business, academic, and consumer communities. Read More.
n essence, Tommaso argued that there is nothing new, unusual or exceptional in recent mergers (such as Dow/DuPont) that have looked at the effects on innovation. In this sense, recent criticism of the Commission practice would not be justified. I agree with this point of view. These cases – as far as I can tell – are competition law as usual. What is more – and perhaps more importantly – there is nothing parameter-specific about innovation. Read More.
It has been just over a year since I last wrote on EU Merger Control and the Innovation Theory of Harm (the ITOH), see here.Read More.
Evangelos Constantinou, Dan Bernhardt
When consumer choice of where to shop is sufficiently price elastic, then in the unique equilibrium, a prisoner’fs dilemma results in which stores have a dominant strategy to price-match. • For intermediate shopping elasticities, two equilibria exist— a low profit equilibrium in which all firms price match, and a high profit equilibrium in which no firm does. • Only when travel is sufficiently costly is the high profit, no-price matching equilibrium unique.Read More.
Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta
This paper shows that vertical foreclosure can have a dynamic rationale. By refusing to supply an efficient downstream rival, a vertically integrated incumbent sacrifices current profits but can exclude the rival by depriving it of the critical profits (or sales) it needs to be successful.Read More.
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