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Here below you find the most read articles on over the last week.
The European Commission’s decision to fine Google reignites debate about the role of competition regulators, how governments police the internet and whether a single public body should act as judge, jury and executioner in such massive legal cases. Behind the €2.42 billion fine lies a more fundamental discussion about the most effective way for authorities to change what they deem to be illegal or harmful business practices. That’s why the second element of Tuesday’s decision — the Commission’s instruction that Google change its algorithm — matters so much. Read More.
JRegardless of the merits and soundness (or lack thereof) of this week’s European Commission Decision in the Google Shopping case — one cannot assess this until we have the text of the decision — two comments really struck me during the press conference. Read More.
Pending a full review of the Commission’s decision which is yet to be published, some preliminary observations can be offered on the Google Search decision which saw the largest antitrust fine ever to be imposed on Google. The infringement, according to the European Commission, is that Google abused its dominant position on the internet search market to favour its own comparison shopping service over those of its rivals (ie comparison shopping sites). Read More.
Today is an important day for EU competition law. For various reasons I have not commented publicly on Google’s cases for over two years now (for our previous extensive coverage, see here) The most recent of those reasons is that whereas I used to be a neutral observer (like Pablo still is) I have recently started advising Google in some competition matters, although as of today not directly on the Shopping case. Read More.
In this article, we extend the literature on merger simulation models by incorporating its potential synergy gains into structural econometric analysis. We present a three-step integrated approach. We estimate a structural demand and supply model, as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). This model allows us to recover the marginal cost of each differentiated product. Then we estimate potential efficiency gains using the Data Envelopment Analysis approach of Bogetoft and Wang (2005), and some assumptions about exogenous cost shifters. In the last step, we simulate the new price equilibrium post merger taking into account synergy gains, and derive price and welfare effects.Read More.
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